In addition to economic performance, this paper explores another incentive factor of local political leaders in China---being clean (or staying away from corruption). Our data suggests that both factors are crucial to provincial leaders' promotion. Given these incentives, this paper establishes a model to describe the decision-making process of political leaders regarding fiscal expenditures, and conducts an empirical test of political budget cycles using Chinese provincial-level data from 1990 to 2006. The findings show that promotion incentives drive cyclical fluctuations in various types of local fiscal expenditures that are synchronized with the timing of the National Congress of the Communist Party (NCCP). Specifically, the growth rate of infrastructure expenditure significantly reduces, while that of administration expenditure increases during the years in which the NCCP takes place. This paper also tests another possible channel of political budget cycles; that is, the time inconsistency effect caused by the turnover of provincial leaders. This effect turns out to be insignificant for all types of expenditures.
Introduction
Over the past three decades, China has experienced rapid economic growth, to which local governments contribute greatly. With the fiscal decentralization introduced as part of the economic reforms since 1979, local governments have been playing an important role in supporting new firms and city construction (Qian and Weingast, 1997; Bai, Tao and Tong, 2008) . At the same time, many researchers point out that political centralization is another crucial ingredient in China's economic development (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2000) . The central government has been in a strong position to either reward or punish local leaders through promotion. (Huang, 1998) . This paper studies how this political control from the central government Using data on the turnover of provincial secretaries between 1990 and 2010, we first examine the role of various incentive factors in determining provincial leaders' turnovers. We find that in addition to the positive effect of economic performance, which is well-documented in the literature, corruption scandals significantly lower the probability of getting promotion. Another interesting finding is that increased
